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For many years, since Baars (1988) explicitly formulated it, contrastive analysis has been the key
methodological approach in experimental studies of consciousness. When certain properly chosen
psychological experimental setups (allowing an invariant target stimulus either to be consciusly
experienced or not) were combined with brain-imaging methods, contrastive analysis became
a quite powerful tool of research (Crick, 1994; Koch, 2004). By subtracting markers of brain
processes recorded in the conditions without conscious experience of the target from the markers
recorded in the conditions where the same target is consciously experienced it was believed that
the markers of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) can be obtained. However, as it turned
out in the subsequent theoretical and experimental analysis, the picture is not so clear and simple
(Bachmann, 2000, 2009; Miller, 2007; Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). For example, when
in the invariant conditions of independent variables a masked visual stimulus was consciously
perceived or not (consciousness of the target standed as a dependent variable), NCC which were
measured as a spectral perturbation of EEG was present already before stimulus presentation
(Aru and Bachmann, 2009). Thus, the neural correlate of consciousness of a stimulus was present
earlier than the stimulus itself was presented. Now, a reader must not get excited here because
instead of some paranormal explanations brain-science based explanations can be comfortably
used.
In order to overcome the conceptual crisis hitting the traditional contrastive analysis based
NCC research it was suggested that unconscious prerequisite processes (NCCpr) emerging as a
result of contrastive analysis of brain-process markers of consciousness and similarly unconscious
consequent processes (NCCco) must be differentiated from the constitutive processes directly
associated with conscious experience (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). Thus, new
experimental approaches were in need to avoid the trap of distilling prerequisite, direct, and
consequent processes as mutually confounded and empirically inseparable. Despite some first
attempts in this direction (Aru and Bachmann, 2015), the specialist landscape in this domain
has remained obscure and no breakthrough solutions have been in sight. Moreover, there seems
to be a number of additional uncertainties when we try to disentangle the various sub-types
of NCC. Even NCCpr and NCCco are not unitary in terms of their theoretical meaning and
associated neural processes. First, as the contents on which the perceptual report is founded
can be selective, the markers of unused conscious contents may be erroneously neglected as
markers of unconscious processes. They actually belong to consciousness level processes, but
related to contents of consciousness qualitatively different from the ones specified by NCC.
Second, in measuring NCC we must be able to disentangle contributions of the general
consciousness enabling mechanisms and the selective contents representing mechanisms because
their markers can be different and thus confused. In what follows I will substantiate these two
issues.
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Variable Criterion Contents in Reporting
Conscious Experience
As stated above, NCCpr and NCCco may be incorrectly
interpreted as markers of no-consciousness. From the perception
research it is well known that one and the same stimulus (e.g.,
as a target in contrastive consciousness research) is experienced
as a more or less complex combination of features and subjective
image characteristics or attributes. Thus, reports about a stimulus
by a subject are based on certain criteria of what to focus on
for reporting the stimulus. In specialist literature the concept
of criterion contents has been used for this (Kahneman, 1968;
Jannati and Di Lollo, 2011; Sackur, 2013; Bachmann and Francis,
2014). This creates a situation where the contents defined by
experimental instruction or intuitively applied by the subject may
be different from the contents experienced before the stimulus as
(a vague) expectation or after the stimulus as a (vague) immediate
memory afterimage. This leads to the possibility that, while
contents of NCCpr and/or contents of NCCco are different from
direct NCC, the results of contrastive analysis will be incorrectly
interpreted. Therefore, although actually there is some subjective
content in experience before the stimulus or after the stimulus,
due to the fact that according to the content this experience
is different from the experience that characterizes direct NCC,
NCCpr, or NCCco will be erroneously interpreted as markers
of no-consciousness. Typically, a subject’s experience in our type
of experiments is this: before the target presentation he/she may
have certain vague expectation of any stimulus, or expectation
(spontaneous or pre-set) of some specific stimulus, which means
there is certain epoch of stimulus-related conscious experience,
albeit not as a response to an actual stimulus. Similarly, when
the target has been briefly flashed (e.g., for 10 or 80ms), a
fleeting experience of its trace can linger for a second or more.
Furthermore, even when after a moment the stimulus-related
experience can fade to zero, subsequently when trying to come to
the response the subject experiences a re-emerging (albeit vague)
representation of the supposed stimulus in working memory.
Thus, NCCco can be also indicative of consciousness as related
to the target, but the contents of this conscious representation
differ to some extent.
General vs. Specific Markers
It is well known that brain systems necessarily involved in
producing conscious experience can be classified as specific
systems (SP) responsible for communicating and representing
the contents of consciousness and non-specific (NSP) systems not
carrying specific contents, but modulating the level of activity
of the specific systems (reviews: Bachmann, 1994; Bachmann
and Hudetz, 2014). As there is no consciousness without its
contents (however indistinct or vague vs. clear or distinct it
is) and because any content cannot be conscious without a
sufficient level of activity of the NSP (interacting with SP),
activity of both SP and NSP should in principle be able to
contribute to the neural markers of consciousness in NCC. This
by default creates an uncertainty with regard to what and to
what extent contributes to the recorded markers of NCC. There
is no known or definitely inevitableprecondition for objective
markers of brain-imaging based NCC unambiguously ascribed to
SP or NSP brain processes unless one can exhaustively measure
the action of SP and NSP systems by appropriate neuroimaging
methods. In most cases it is likely that brain-imaging results
display contributions of NSP/SP interaction, but sometimes it
can be exclusively SP (e.g., in its amplified mode) or NSP (e.g.,
as more ignited). Therefore, in order to advance our theoretical
thinking for constraining experimental design or at least for
sensible interpretation of empirical results we should first try
at least conceptually to distinguish NCC/SP, NCC/NSP, and
NCC/SP×NSP. The contribution of NSP is considered as a
general marker invariant to specific contents. The need to use a
tripartite NCC with regard to SP/NSP involvement comes from
the respective neurobiological reality (Koch, 2004; Bachmann
and Hudetz, 2014). If we really want to understand NCC,
action of these subsystems can be and should be measured
experimentally.
The Premises for a Taxonomy
Based on the above considerations, we must think of NCC in
terms of several possibilities: (i) NCCpr/general as related to
the contribution of NSP which is reflected in brain-imaging
markers and which appears as a result of contrastive analysis
(NCCprG); (ii) NCC/general related to the contribution of NSP
analogously to (i) (NCCG); (iii) NCCco/general related to the
contribution of NSP analogously to (i) (NCCcoG). Similarly, with
regard to SP we have: (iv) NCCprSP; (v) NCCSP; (vi) NCCcoSP.
The further variants (vii), (viii), (ix) refer to NCCprG×SP,
NCCG×SP, NCCcoG×SP, respectively. In what follows I will give
some examples of the mental processes exemplifying the different
items of this NCC taxonomy.
For NCCprG a typical situation involves attentional alerting
necessarily preceding a target if a peri-threshold target is to
become consciously perceived. It is possible that pre-target
EEG phase contributes to this (Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson
et al., 2009). NCCG might mean that neural markers of
actual non-specific reticulo-thalamo-cortical modulation have
been effectively recorded. The NCCG×SP, in turn, might mean
that the markers of the processes recorded in the contrastive
experiment reflect neural processes of interaction between active
specific content-representing modules and non-specific reticulo-
thalamo-cortical modulation. In the case of these taxons it
would be both interesting and important to distinguish within-
modal feature-specific modulation and pan-modal modulation
universal for different sensory modalities. Thus, experiments are
needed directly and selectively manipulating each of these effects
(e.g., Pillay et al., 2014; Manita et al., 2015). In NCCcoG we
might see a signature of a kind of “afterglow” of the NSP activity
following a successful facilitative modulation of the specific
contents-carrying neural units.
For NCCprSP the following are typical variants: (a) conscious
expectancy of certain stimulus alternative before actual stimulus
presentation, (b) pre-conscious priming of target-related neural
nodes necessary for the subsequent successful target perception
at the conscious level. (An interesting theoretical puzzle appears
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when we accept the possibility that the NCCpr process going
on at the pre-conscious level can (and in many cases does)
continue during the direct NCCSP when the target is directly
perceived in consciousness. Should we term the same neural
process now a constituent of consciousness (because it is present
during conscious perception) or still a pre-requisite? By virtue
of interaction with additional processes involved in NCC the
formerly pre-requisite process may transform to a direct NCCSP
process). Obviously, NCCSP signifies stimulus content-specific
processes accompanying explicit conscious experience of the
target stimulus. However, by itself, for NCCSP it is not clear
whether it is brought about by exhaustive representation of
target stimulus features and attributes, or only by a certain
sub-sample or part of the whole. Especially here the notion of
criterion contents becomes relevant. Future experiments should
explicitly pay attention to the criterion contents as a purposely
used variable in NCC research based on contrastive analysis.
Moreover, according to the microgenetic stance of conscious
perception every percept unfolds over successive stages where
the subjective contents change in real time (Bachmann, 2000).
Typically, coarse and less distinct stages precede more detailed
and stable stages. When measurement of NCC is based on
target responses indicative of the full-blown, stabilized target
perception, the NCC indicative of an underdeveloped form and
immature content of the target stimulus—and therefore still
NCC—are erroneusly attributed to NCCpr. Understanding of
this could help solve the controversies related to estimation of the
time it takes to build up a conscious percept. It is highly likely that
certain earlier signatures (e.g., ERP components N100, N200) as
markers of the putative NCCpr are actually an early marker of
NCC, but related to conscious contents of an immature stage of
the percept under microgenetic development.
With NCCcoSP we have a similar problem like with other
categories of NCC. Due to different qualitative contents of the
immediate memory of the target stimulus compared to NCCSP,
the NCCcoSP need not be amarker of unconscious consequences
of the preceding conscious processing, but a marker of the
temporally lingering and less distinct experience of the target
when it is represented in the active working memory. On the
other hand, NCCcoSP can be also a marker of some subliminal
trace of the specific contents of the preceding target’s conscious
experience.
The above considerations stressing the relatively long duration
of an experimental episode involving target awareness bring in a
problem for interpreting, for example, the ERP or MEG markers
of consciousness. Because the full microgenetic process of target
conscious perception unfolds from proto-object, immature stage
to a clear and detailed stage and thereafter the seconds long
stage of immediate memory experience (which alltogether take
several seconds as a minimum), markers such as visual awareness
negativity (VAN) (Railo et al., 2011) whose wave spans barely a
100ms and P300 whose wave takes a few 100ms, are definitely
inadequate to echo the real-time duration of the conscious
experience related to the target stimulus. Instead, we may have
cases of markers of access to certain level or stage of conscious
processing, but not the one-to-one reflection of target-related
conscious experience in real time.
We have to bear in mind that there are two types of
the experimental criteria of subjective evaluation of contents
depending on whether they are universal and possible to use
panmodally (i.e., for evaluation of visual, auditory, tactile etc
contents) or modality-specific. Attributes like “clarity,” “unity vs.
fragmentedness,” “detailedness,” “duration,” “salience,” etc. can be
used panmodally. The second type is specific to modality, such
as brightness, color, slant, shape, edges/lines, loudness, timbre,
phonemic composition, roughness, painfulness, temperature,
etc. (of course, cross-modal and synaesthetic qualities can
be also considered). Universal panmodal attributes of the
consciousness contents are regulated by the brain systems
responsible for the levels of consciousness (Bachmann, 2012).
A recent fine example of how recording contrastive NCC by
MEG can indicate differences in universal subjective evaluations
is published by Andersen et al. (2015). Future experiments
must directly disentangle contributions of the modality-specific
content-systems and panmodal level-systems.
Conclusions
The main messages of this opinion paper can be summarized
as follows. Although, at first it may seem that brain-imaging
results of contrastive anaysis indicate three types of NCC
among which two (NCCpr and NCCco) refer to unconscious
processes, a more careful analysis shows that in many cases
these seemingly unconscious-process markers actually belong
to consciousness level processes, albeit related to contents of
consciousness qualitatively different from the ones specified
by NCC. In trying to disentangle different subtypes of NCC,
contributions of general, and content specific brain systems must
also be differentiated.
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